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THE TROUBLE WITH TE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN A
POSTMODERN, MULTICULTURAL WORLD
CARRIE MENKEL-M1EADOW'
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Essay I suggest the heretical notion that the adversary
system may no longer be the best method for our legal system to
deal with all of the matters that come within its purview. If late-
twentieth century learning has taught us anything, it is that
truth is illusive, partial, interpretable, dependent on the charac-
teristics of the knowers as well as the known, and, most impor-
tantly, complex. In short, there may be more than just two sides
to every story. The binary nature of the adversary system and
its particular methods and tactics often may thwart some of the
essential goals of any legal system. This Essay argues that our
epistemology has changed sufficiently in this era of
poststructural, postmodern knowledge so that we need to reex-
amine the attributes of the adversary system as the "ideal type"
of a legal system, and also reexamine the practice based on the
premises of that system. Although some scholars justify the ad-
versary system on the grounds that it satisfies a variety of truth
and justice criteria,' I believe that consideration of those crite-
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1. See generally David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAW-
YER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83, 93-111 (David Luban ed., 1983)
[hereinafter THE GOOD LAWYER] (describing various justifications for the adversary
system).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ria is, itself, contingent and must be historicized and reconsid-
ered as our knowledge base changes.
In this Essay I argue that the adversary system is inadequate,
indeed dangerous, for satisfying a number of important goals of
any legal or dispute resolution system. My critique operates at
several different levels of the adversary system: epistemological,
structural, remedial, and behavioral. I suggest that we should
rethink both the goals our legal system should serve and the
methods we use to achieve those goals. For those who cleave to
the adversary system,2 I want to shift the burden of proof to
them to convince us that the adversary system continues to do
its job better than other methods we might use.
My critiques, to be further elaborated below, are briefly as
follows: Binary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute are
not the best way for us to learn the truth; polarized debate dis-
torts the truth,3 leaves out -important information,4 simplifies
complexity, and obfuscates rather than clarifies.5 More signifi-
cantly, some matters-mostly civil, but occasionally even crim-
inal, cases-are not susceptible to a binary (i.e., right/wrong,
win/lose) conclusion or solution. The inability to reach a binary
resolution of these disputes may result because in some cases we
cannot determine the facts with any degree of accuracy. In other
cases the law may bestow conflicting, though legitimate, legal
rights giving some entitlements to both, or all, parties.6 And, in
2. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE (1982) (defining the
lawyer's goals in competitive terms, such as winning); MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) (exploring the impact of the con-
flict between moral obligations and duties to the client); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UN-
DERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (1990) (expressing a traditional view of the lawyer's
role in the adversary system).
3. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980); Marvin E. Frankel, The
Search for Truth. An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975) [hereinafter
Frankel, The Search for Truth]; Philip Shuchman, The Question of Lawyers' Deceit,
53 CONN. B.J. 101 (1979); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client
Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1303 (1995).
4. See, e.g., A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth,
1978 DUKE L.J. 921 (discussing how the defense counsel in criminal cases may sup-
press the truth).
5. Consider how the "evidence" emerged in the O.J. Simpson trial. See, e.g., Eliz-
abeth Gleick, Is the End Nigh? All Sides Take Lumps As the O.J. Case Wends Its
Way Toward the Jury, TIME, Sept. 18, 1995, at 54 (discussing the presentation of
evidence in the O.J. Simpson case).
6. See generally John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The
[Vol. 38:5
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yet another category of cases, human or emotional equities can-
not be divided sharply.7
Modern life presents us with complex problems,' often requir-
ing complex and multifaceted solutions. -Courts, with what I
have called their "limited remedial imaginations,"9 may not be
the best institutional settings for resolving some of the disputes
that we continue to put before them.
Even if some form of the adversary system was defensible in
particular settings' ° for purposes of adjudication," the "adver-
sary" model employed in the courtroom has bled inappropriately
into and infected other aspects of lawyering, including negotia-
tions "carried on both "in the shadow of the court"2 and outside
Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 750, 753-54 (1964) (describing situ-
ations in which compromise is preferable to "winner-take-all" results); John E. Coons,
Compromise as Precise Justice, in COMPROMISE IN ETHIcs, LAW, AND PoLITIcs 190,
199 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979) (explaining how a system
of apportionment is preferable when conflicting policy values should be recognized in
the outcome of litigation).
7. For example, in custody cases both parents may have equally valid legal and
emotional claims.
8. Consider how manufacturers of dangerous or toxic products have utilized
bankruptcy proceedings to limit damages for their past acts and thus not only limit
compensation for the injured, but threaten the economic security of present workers
and others with whom such companies do business. See RICHARD B. SOBEL, BENDING
THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991).
9. Statutes and common law limit the courts' "imaginations" to the powers of
granting monetary damages or injunctions. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward An-
other View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV.
754 (1984).
10. Many have argued that the criminal justice system demands more
adversarialism than the civil justice system and that ethics rules should reflect the
differences. See, e.g., Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of
Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669 (1978) (distinguishing the ethical responsibilities of
advocates from nonadvocate attorneys); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil
Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 1, at 150, 155-56 (discussing the adver-
sary system in the context of criminal trials).
11. Monroe Freedman was among the first to argue that our adversary system is
constitutionally mandated, residing in the Bill of Rights. See Monroe H. Freedman,
Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41 EMORY L.J. 467 (1992). For
other claims that the adversary system is constitutionally mandated, at least in
criminal cases, see CHARLES W. WOLFRAMf, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 564 (1986); Jay S.
Silver, Professionalism and the Hidden Assault on the Adversarial Process, 55 OHIO
ST. L.J. 855, 857-66, 886 (1994).
12. The phrase is evoked by, but is different from, that used by Mnookin and
Kornhauser. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
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of it in lawyers' transactional work. 3
Even in situations that call simply for factual determinations,
the complexities of modern life-for example, the strong race
issues implicated in several recent, notorious American cas-
es"--contribute to the problematic result that different people
will interpret the same "fact" in different ways. 5 Because of
such interpretive differences, therefore, I find not only the struc-
tures of the adversary system wanting, but also how we think
about the people within those structures.
Modern scholars outside of, as well as within, law have ques-
tioned each of the following assumptions underlying the use of
the adversary system-objectivity, neutrality, argument by oppo-
sition and refutation, appeals to common and shared values, and
fairness. s In my view, it is time for us to examine how these
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
13. For discussions of the inappropriateness of extreme forms of adversarialism in
negotiation, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9; Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of
Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219 (1990); cf Eleanor H. Norton, Bargain-
ing and the Ethics of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (1989) (discussing how the
bargaining process influences ethical behavior); James J. White, Machiavelli and the
Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926
(addressing the difficulty of devising appropriate rules concerning truthfulness in
negotiations).
14. Many of these cases also demonstrate the power of binary thinking in black-
and-white terms, rather than in the more complex multiracial, multicultural world in
which we live. See, e.g., California To Investigate Alleged Fuhrman Perjury, WASH.
POST, Nov. 28, 1995, at A 11 (discussing perjury accusations against a detective in
the O.J. Simpson case); William Claiborne, 'A Majority Black Jury Won't Convict in
a Case Like This,' Clark Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1995, at A4 (discussing racial is-
sues in the O.J. Simpson murder trial); William Hamilton, Jury Declines To Convict
LA. Defendants on Last 2 Charges, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1993, at A3 (reporting the
jury's verdict in the trial of Damian Williams and Henry Watson, the two men con-
victed of beating Reginald Denny).
15. See, e.g., David F. Hall et al., Postevent Information and Changes in Recollec-
tion for a Natural Event, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
124 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984) (explaining how an eyewitness
is influenced by multiple factors in his or her presentation of the events).
16. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 144-46 (1983) (discuss-
ing the diverse and multicultural history of alternative dispute settlement institu-
tions in the United States); JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY
IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 80-102 (1973) (explaining that "frequently the partisanship of
the opposing lawyers blocks the uncovering of vital evidence or ... distorts it");
Kenneth J. Arrow, Information Acquisition and the Resolution of Conflict, in BAR-
RIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 259, 270 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (ex-
plaining the deficiencies of the adversary model in information gathering and conflict
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assumptions, which often are not "true," have affected our legal
system. Lay people claim a crisis of legitimacy in the legal sys-
tem, especially, for example, when the "race card" is deemed
more important than any other factor in a trial, 7 often not
trusting jury verdicts. As scholars, we must take these criticisms
seriously.
Multiculturalism, and all of the controversy that it has
spawned in the universities," has at least reminded us that
there is demographic, as well as epistemological,
"positionality"9 and we do not all see things the same way.
With a healthy respect for the new knowledge about knowledge,
we need to examine whether the adversary system helps or
hinders the way we sort out disputes, differences, misunder-
standings, and wrongdoings.
Furthermore, the complexities of both modern life and modern
lawsuits have shown us that disputes often have more than two
sides in the sense that legal disputes and transactions involve
resolution); David W. Johnson & Roger T. Johnson, Social Interdependence: Coopera-
tive Learning in Education, in CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN-
SPIRED BY THE WORK OF MORTON DEUTSCH 205, 221 (Barbara B. Bunker et al. eds.,
1995) [hereinafter CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND JUSTICE] (stating that "cooperative
efforts are more effective than competitive and individualistic efforts").
17. The trials of Rodney King, Reginald Denny's assaulters, and O.J. Simpson all
illustrate the use of the "race card." See supra note 14 and accompanying text. For-
mer Los Angeles District Attorney Ira Reiner, during the O.J. Simpson trial, opined
that if the majority-black jury heard the Mark Fuhrman tapes their disgust at the
racism exhibited therein could lead to an acquittal, indicating that he believed race
would become more salient than any of the factual evidence heard in the case.
Jessica Seigel, A Tough Decision for Judge: Relevant or Red Herring? Tapes Ruling
May Decide Simpson Case, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 1995, at 1.
18. See, e.g., ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987) (criticiz-
ing the impact of political correctness on intellectual freedom in higher education);
DEBATING P.C.: THE CONTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE CAM-
PUSES (Paul Berman ed., 1992) (discussing various facets of the debate over political
correctness in higher education); ROBERT HUGHES, THE CULTURE OF COMPLAINT: THE
FRAYING OF AMERICA (1993) (discussing the relationship between culture and morali-
ty in American intellectual life); RUSSELL JACOBY, DOGMATIC WISDOM: HOW THE
CULTURE WARS DIVERT EDUCATION AND DISTRACT AMERICA (1994) (analyzing the
backlash against liberal education).
19. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829
(1990) (advocating positionality as an explanation of what it means to be "right" in
the law); cf Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1745 (1989) (criticizing the "essentialism" of "positionality" from particular de-
mographic characteristics).
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many more than two parties. Procedures and forms like inter-
pleader, joinder, consolidation, and class actions have attempted
to allow more than just plaintiffs' and defendants' voices to be
heard, all the while structuring the discourse so that parties ul-
timately must align themselves on one side of the adversarial
line or another. Multiparty, multiplex ° lawsuits or disputes
may be distorted when only two sides are possible. Consider all
of the multiparty and complex policy issues that courts contend
with in environmental clean-up and siting,2 ' labor disputes in
the public sector,22 consumer actions,23 antitrust actions,24
mass torts,25 school financing and desegregation,26 and other
civil rights issues,27 to name a few examples.
Finally, scholars have criticized modern adversarialism for the
ways it teaches people to act toward each other.28 Although I
share some of the critics' views regarding the incivility of law-
yers,29 I am more concerned that the rhetoric and structure of
adversarial discourse prevent not just better and nicer behav-
20. Lon Fuller's essay on the structure of mediation reminds us that complex mul-
tiplex, multiparty disputes may belong in forms other than adjudication. See Lon L.
Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971).
21. See, e.g., Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994) (involving
a suit by private corporation that incurred environmental clean-up costs against an-
other responsible party to recover those costs).
22. See, e.g., Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors, 507 U.S. 218 (1993) (involving a suit by nonunion employers to enjoin state
agency from directing construction bidders to abide by labor agreement).
23. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995) (involving a
class action by members of an airline's frequent flyer program alleging violation of
consumer laws).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (in-
volving a civil antitrust complaint alleging violations of the Sherman Act).
25. See Georgine v. Anchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub
nom., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 65 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1996) (No.
96-270) (involving a proposed class action settlement of multiple asbestos claims).
26. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (involving litigation over a
court order detailing a school desegregation remedy and the financing necessary to
implement it).
27. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996) (involving class action by
prison inmates alleging violations of constitutional rights).
28. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 609-10 (discussing the relationship
between adverse attorneys).
29. See, e.g., Marvin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28
VAL. U. L. REv. 513 (1994) (suggesting that the decline in attorney civility may
threaten the orderly function of our legal system).
1996] TROUBLE WITH ADVERSARY SYSTEM
ior,3° but more accurate and open thinking.
A culture of adversarialism, based on our legal system,3' has
infected a wide variety of social institutions. Although I will
focus primarily on the legal system and legal ethics here, consid-
er how debate, argument, and adversarialism have, in recent
years, dominated journalism, both print and electronic media,
political campaigns, educational discourse, race relations, gender
relations, and labor and management relations, to name only a
few examples.
After I critique the adversary system, you will wonder what I
would substitute for it. It should be obvious that as a
postmodern, multicultural thinker I have no one panacea, solu-
tion, or process to offer-instead, I think we should contemplate
a variety of different ways to structure process in our legal sys-
30. I am on record as being "for" good and nice behavior wherever possible. See
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
385, 407-19 (1992).
31. Although I do not have time or space in the present Essay to discuss the
sources of adversarialism, it is important to note here that the legal system cannot
be blamed for all adversarialism. For some review of the history of American
adversarialism, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,' A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973);
STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYsTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984).
Formal rules of logic, and Aristotelian and classic philosophy, have long favored argu-
ment, dialectics, and debate as ideal ways of learning the truth. See, e.g., STANLEY
FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 478-79 (1989). Marxism and other "-isms"
are based on the dialectics of reasoning of Hegel. See generally Nancy C.M. Hartsock,
The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical
Materialism, in DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY,
METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 283, 296, 298, 309 (San-
dra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983) (illustrating the intersection of Marx-
ist and Hegelian thought) [hereinafter DISCOVERING REALITY]. At another level, ath-
letic and military competition have long been valued by a wide variety of cultures.
Indeed, I am not the first to argue that legal advocacy has borrowed too much from
the practices and language of sports and war. See Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a
Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1991); see also
WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 567; Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How
Images of Battle, Sports and Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WISC. WOMEN'S
L.J. 225 (1995). Judge Frankel notes the phrase "sporting theory" of justice was prob-
ably dich6 when Roscoe Pound used it in his famous address in 1906. Roscoe Pound,
The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A.
REP. 395, 404 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 241, 281 (1964); Frankel, The Search for
Truth, supra note 3, at 1033 n.5. Unfortunately, with the growing importance of
computers in our lives, we may be entering an age of mandated binarism and artifi-
cial categories.
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tern to reflect our multiple goals and objectives. For example, to
achieve the goal of determining criminal guilt a different process
may be required than is required for allocating money or hu-
man, parental, or civil rights. Sometimes other processes, such
as mediation, inquisitorial-bureaucratic investigation, public fora
or conversations, "intermediate sites of discourse," 2 private
problem-solving (negotiation) or group negotiation, and coalition
and consensus building33 would resolve better the legal and
other issues involved. I am thus suggesting variety and diversity
for our legal process that will, in turn, require more diverse and
complex thinking about which legal ethics would be appropriate
in different settings.34 Some might prefer to reform the adver-
sary system to keep it protean enough to remain inclusive, as a
model, for our entire legal system. In my own view, this will not
be adequate. We 'need to explore alternative models of legal
process and ethics that will better meet the needs of more com-
plex postmodern, multicultural disputes and issues.
II. THE PITFALLS OF ADVERSARIAL / BINARY THINKING IN A
POSTMODERN WORLD
Although I cannot, in this limited time or space, review the
full history and sources of this country's particular approach to
adversarialism, I note that the Anglo-American legal system did
32. See Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, Reflections on Race Talk (1995) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) for an eloquent description of how different
forms and structures of process and conversation, such as within legal education, can
produce different levels of revelation, honest discussion, and engagement, and ulti-
mately "truth" and understanding.
33. See Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors' Com-
mittees, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1547 (1996).
34. I am currently engaged in this project myself as I look at what ethics are
required in alternative dispute resolution settings that may differ from legal ethics
in the adversary setting. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ancillary Practice and
Conflicts of Interests: When Lawyer Ethics Are Not Enough, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG., Feb. 1995, at 15 [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Ancillary Practice]; Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Conflicts and Mediation Practice, DiSP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1996,
at 6 [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Conflicts]; cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., When ADR
Is Ancillary to a Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Confront Conflicts Issues, ALTERNA-
TIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Dec. 1994, at 147 (arguing that a law firm engaged in
ADR practice should observe the rules of ethics). I currently chair the CPR Commis-
sion on Ethics and Standards in Alternative Dispute Resolution.
[Vol. 38:5
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not originate the idea of oppositional presentations of "facts."
Both classical philosophical discourse 5 and medieval scholastic
disputations 6 exhibit the belief that contested, oppositional
presentations of "facts" will best reveal the truth. At this point
we should note quickly one important error in the defense of the
legal adversary system drawn from this tradition. Whatever the
flaws of oppositional thinking discussed below, philosophers and
others using this form of logic, at least, are committed theoreti-
cally to a genuine search for the truth. This is not the motivat-
ing ideal when an ethics regime that places duty to the client at
least as high, if not higher than, the duty to truth harnesses the
adversary system to the legal system." Although philosophers
may seek the truth, lawyers seek to achieve their client's inter-
ests and to "win," which may entail simply obfuscating the other
side's case-as in the "creation" of reasonable doubt in the crimi-
nal case-or leaving out important facts if they are deemed
harmful. Even if the particular use of the oppositional/adversary
model can be defended as a procedure of knowledge and truth-
finding in other settings, as used in legal settings it lacks an
important quality: the genuine search for truth.
35. As my colleague, philosopher Stephen Munzer, pointed out in a personal com-
munication, however, the dialogues of Plato or Socrates were not "real" but were,
rather, staged efforts to canvass and dispute particular ideas. Nevertheless, philoso-
phers thought that we would best arrive at the truth by proposing and refuting
ideas. See Janice Moulton, A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method, in
DISCOVERING REALITY, supra note 31, at 149.
36. The medieval universities sought knowledge by public "disputations" and de-
bates. See generally ALFONSO MAIERfJ, UNIVERSITY TRAINING IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE
127-30 (D.N. Pryds trans. & ed., 1994) (discussing disputations). Consider that our
modem "defense" of the dissertation derives from this tradition.
37. Many scholars, judges, and practitioners have discussed whether truth or other
goals are the primary rationale for our adversary system. See, e.g., FRANK, supra
note 16, at 80-102 (comparing the "fight" and "truth" theories); Frankel, The Search
for Truth, supra note 3; Morley R. Gorsky, The Adversary System, in PHILOSOPHICAL
LAW: EQUALITY, ADJUDICATION, PRIVACY 127, 131-35 (Richard Bronaugh ed., 1978)
[hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL LAW] (explaining how the rules of evidence inhibit fact
finding); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confiden-
tiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966). Although some argue that our system values
"justice" or human and individual freedom and dignity over truth, others suggest
that winning and victory are the real goals that compete with truth and justice. See
DERSHOWrrz, supra note 2, at xvi-xvii; see also Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique,
Novel and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988).
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Despite the longevity and robustness of adversarialism as a
mode of human discourse,38  even some philosophers and
epistemologists have questioned its value as the best way to un-
derstand the world. 9 It is this feature of postmodernism that I
want to apply critically to the adversary system as we know it in
the legal system. In general terms, a variety of philosophers, lit-
erary critics, art and architecture critics, social scientists, and
legal scholars have questioned whether any "truth" exists out
there that is knowable and stable.4 ° Postmodernism expresses
some skepticism, if not cynicism, in the belief that there are
immutable, universal, global, and discoverable facts or interpre-
tations of facts.4' Whether by literary deconstruction,42 femi-
nist epistemology,43 philosophical or linguistic decompositions of
language,44 or in our own field, critical legal studies' exposure
of the indeterminancies of our laws,45  the legacy of
postmodernism is that truth is not fixed, meanings are "located"
provisionally, not "discovered,"46 and people who "find" truth,
38. Other modes of human discourse exist from which we could choose-the scien-
tific method, for example, which, although it needs to "falsify" propositions with con-
trary data, does not set out to prove something by juxtaposing its opposite. Addition-
ally, conversation, storytelling, mediation, and consciousness-raising are all more
circular and less structured in method. Dangerous monologic (or false adversarial)
forms like inquisitions and Star Chambers also exist. Finally, there are other, com-
pletely different legal systems-civil, mediational, and bureaucratic systems are
examples.
39. See supra note 16.
40. See generally DISCOVERING REALITY, supra note 31 (discussing feminist philo-
sophical perspectives illustrating deconstructionism); FISH, supra note 31, at 154-55
(noting the pervasiveness of deconstructionism).
41. For an excellent summary of the major contributions of postmodernism to
social science from which much of the above discussion is drawn, see PAULINE M.
ROSENAU, POST MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS, INROADS, AND IN-
TRUSIONS (1991).
42. Literary deconstruction uncovers the suppressed meanings of a text that ren-
ders the text indeterminate.
43. Feminist epistemology seeks to uncover the biases of scientists. See, e.g., SAN-
DRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?: THINKING FROM WOMEN'S
LIVES (1991) (a feminist critique of science).
44. See Merrill B. Hintikka & Jaakko Hintikka, How Can Language Be Sexist?, in
DISCOVERING REALITY, supra note 31, at 139.
45. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 86-113 (1987)
(elaborating the theories on which critical approaches to law in a variety of fields
expose the contradictions of legal foundationalism).
46. These phrases are Rosenau's. See ROSENAU, supra note 41. Thus, there is
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whether judges, juries, critics, or, yes, even scientists, have in-
terests-social, economic, political, racial, gender-that affect
how they see the world. In addition to interpretations of texts,
meanings, and facts, postmodernists have questioned the very
notion of a unified self having a stable set of characteristics,
values, and attributes with which to process information.4" Be-
cause we occupy multiple roles in modern society, being power-
ful in some-for example, the role of "father"--but subordinated
in others-for example, the role of "worker"-the multiplicity of
our social roles structures and filters our knowledge. Con-
text-both present and our own personal and group histo-
ries-also deeply affects our knowledge. If we believe any of this
(and I believe enough of it to consider the impact it might have
on the finding of facts, the interpretation of law, and the produc-
tion of "legal knowledge"), we must therefore ask how the legal
system can assess truth and assign remedies confidently.
In an important book describing the significance of
postmodernism for explaining social science's knowledge, Pau-
"truth" in many cases-i.e., O.J. Simpson either did or did not kill his ex-wife and
Ronald Goldman. Because we have only circumstantial evidence, jurors must "inter-
pret" and give meaning to the evidence-therefore, their factual determinations will
reflect greater variability. See Albert J. Moore, Inferential Streams: The Articulation
and Illustration of the Trial Advocate's Evidentiary Intuitions, 34 UCLA L. REV. 611
(1987). In my view, and as part of my critique of the adversary system, most trial
advocacy texts (and I am a former trial advocacy teacher) still assume a far too
rational fact-finding process. See THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECH-
NIQUES (3d ed. 1992); J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS
AND ETMCS (2d ed. 1983). Practical lawyer guides are much more likely to attempt
to deal with the emotional or "arational"-note that this is not "irrational"-aspects
of fact finding and interpretation. For one attempt to deal with some aspects of
"emotional" arguments, see ALBERT J. MOORE ET AL., TRIAL ADVOCACY: INFERENCES,
ARGUMENTS, AND TECHNIQUES 80-89 (1996) (see chapter 9 on "silent argument"). Too
many of the trial texts also treat all jurors as the same "average" or fungible juror,
instead of recognizing the clear reality of widely disparate reactions to the same
information by different people who may process "facts" through very different "fil-
ters" or "generalizations." We have little that focuses on the "interpretative acts" of
jurors, as analogous to the interpretative acts of readers in literature, despite all of
the wonderful empirical jury studies. See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR,
JUDGING THE JURY (1986) (analyzing critically research on juries); REID HASTIE ET
AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983) (describing empirical research on juries).
47. See MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM (1992); Naomi Scherman,
Individualism and the Objects of Psychology, in DISCOVERING REALITY, supra note 31,
at 225.
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line Rosenau has distinguished between more skeptical, nihilis-
tic postmoderns who believe that "truth" is always partial, tran-
sitory, and uncertain, and affirmative postmoderns who instead
seek to broaden and increase the methods of knowledge acquisi-
tion.48 Affirmative postmoderns would, thus, include the recent
spate of narrative writers in legal scholarship49 who seek to
increase the stories that are told and heard0 in our legal sys-
tem and appeal to empathy51 and affective, as well as ratio-
nal, 2 ways of knowing.
Both groups of postmoderns share a skepticism that truth can
be "represented" accurately. This claim, which originates in art
and literary criticism,53 has some dangerous teaching for our
rules of evidence and trial procedure. Although our various
exclusionary rules are designed to protect against some distor-
tions in "factual" representations, so that over-probative and
prejudicial forms of evidence often are excluded, oppositional
fact presentation itself may deserve criticism for its inherent
need to involve extreme or distorted "representations" of past
acts and motives that may be impossible to "re-present" in a
courtroom.5 4
48. See supra note 41.
49. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW (1993) (discussing the
competing conceptions of the humanities as a method of criticizing the law's authori-
ty); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) (using person-
al narrative to discuss issues of race and law); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (a symposium on the use of narrative in the law); Toni
M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989) (explaining how the movement to legal nar-
ratives is a rebellion against the abstract nature of traditional legal discourse).
50. For a look at the vigorous debate on the validation of these stories, see
Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991); Daniel A.
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narra-
tives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
51. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574
(1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Power of Narrative in Empathetic Learning: Post-
Modernism and the Stories of Law, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 287 (1992) (reviewing
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)).
52. For an evocative argument that there are many ways (some of them gendered)
of learning and "knowing," see WOMEN'S WAY OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SELF, VOICE, AND MIND (Mary F. Belenky et al. eds., 1985).
53. FISH, supra note 31, at 154.
54. Some of the postmodern attacks on knowledge would reject any legal system.
If the truth is unknowable, then inquisitorial, and bureaucratic, and "alternative"
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Let me illustrate the particular dilemma of oppositional, bina-
ry thinking at trial when linked with recent work in cognitive
psychology and trial practice. If we take seriously the recent
studies demonstrating that facts presented to fact finders are
processed through "schemas," "filters," or common narratives,' 5
then the presentation of two oppositional stories or conclusions
may color how all of the facts are heard. Consider how the fram-
ing of a story by both sides then colors how each piece of evi-
dence is interpreted. The oppositional story may work well when
the fact finder has an off/on, guilt/innocence determination to
make," though it still carries the danger that all the fact find-
ers will process incremental facts through a preexisting
frame, 7 but will not work as well when polycentric factual find-
ings, legal conclusions, and mixed fact/law questions are at is-
sue: comparative negligence, business necessity defenses, excuse
and justification in criminal law, and the best interest of the
child, are a few examples. My argument here is that the "false"
or "exaggerated" representation"8 of oppositional stories may
oversimplify the facts59 and not permit adequate consideration
systems of dispute resolution would fare no better in discerning facts.
55. See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALI-
TY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981) (de-
scribing the use of stories in legal judgments); JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M.
O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE
(1990) (examining the tensions in the law with legal- (rule) and relationship-based
"voices" of lay litigants).
56. Consider how you "filtered" each of the individual facts in the O.J. Simpson
case given your "conclusion" about whether he was guilty or innocent. What would it
have taken to change your mind? Consider this same question in light of different
and more complicated issues: Does Microsoft have too large a share of the software
market? What should be done if you think it does?
57. Here is my de rigueur cite to THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIEN-
TIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970), telling us that we can understand reality only
through historically contingent paradigms, like the lawyer's oppositional stories,
which do, on occasion, shift. Id. at 43-51.
58. What postmodernists call constructivism is the advocate's stock-in-trade.
59. Stanley Fish has gone so far as to say that all knowledge claims merely re-
sult from contextual and artificial agreements among professional communities. See
FISH, supra note 31. So, if we cannot justify adequately the adversary system, and
most philosophers have agreed that we cannot-see Luban, supra note 1, at 93-
111-then the adversary system itself is the product of our professional "conspiracy"
to perpetuate its existence. It has not been validated empirically. Id. at 118; cf E.
ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
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of fact interpretations or conclusions that either fall somewhere
in between, or are totally outside of, the range of the lawyers'
presentations." Indeed, one version of postmodernism could
read the adversary system as totally and arbitrarily imposing
order through its binary decision making process where no order
exists, and where we cannot determine relevance rationally."'
An implicit, but sometimes explicit, aspect of all
postmodernism is a skepticism about both objectivity and neu-
trality. This has serious implications for our adversary system,
not only for the advocate's role, but for the so-called neutral,
passive judge as well. Critical legal scholars have advanced most
explicitly the skeptical argument of postmodernism by demon-
strating both the law's linguistic contingency-its indetermin-
ance-and its manipulation by particularized interests, such as
economic, or class (in critical legal theory), or race-based inter-
ests in critical race theory, and gender-based interests in femi-
nist legal thought.62 Most critical legal scholars' work has fo-
cused on the law and rules-the "texts" of the legal system.63
The attacks on certainty, legal knowledge, and neutrality, how-
ever, have clear and dangerous implications for legal process,
and for the adversary system." A neutral judge, either as a
(1988) (analyzing the fairness of procedures and social processes); JOHN THIBAUT &
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) (analyz-
ing methods of conflict resolution in the context of social psychology).
60. Jury nullification may represent one effort to escape not just the law but also
the need for binary fact determinations-maybe somebody was "a little bit
guilty"--say, entrapped, but guilty, or, guilty but not responsible. Obviously, the
more varied possibilities in equity also represent an effort to avoid the draconian
effects of law's oppositional possibilities.
61. This view also coincides with chaos theory-that causality is not as linear as
we modern science romanticists believe. Consider the arguments about "relevance" in
the ever-expanding soap opera of the O.J. Simpson case and its aftermath-was
what Detective Fuhrman said about Judge Ito's wife relevant to the guilt or inno-
cence of Simpson? Where does the seamless web of the facts end?
62. In feminist epistemology more generally, philosophers of science have argued
that even the construction of questions of "truth" in science have depended upon the
"bias" of the masculinist view of reality. Consider the metaphors of "competition" and
"survival of the fittest" and the struggle of the cell as examples. See SANDRA HAR-
DING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986); EVELYN F. KELLER, A FEELING
FOR THE ORGANISM: THE LIFE AND WORK OF BARBARA MCCLINTOCK (1983).
63. See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 45, at 15-63 (chapter on rules and standards).
64. I am reminded of the article in Time magazine a few years ago that attempt-
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passive umpire of a trial process or as a more active fact-finder,
likely will be predisposed to favor one side of the story over the
other or to favor his or her own interpretation of the story.65
Party-initiated presentation of evidence might not uncover a
judge's predisposition when the lawyers cannot learn the judge's
own story. Some use this postmodern strategy to critique the
false claims of objectivity and neutrality; others suggest that we
simply should acknowledge the difference in values and accept
that we may not have total unanimity over "fundamental inter-
ests."6 The latter group of postmoderns argue that we should
make explicit the appeal to fact finders' different values, beliefs,
or emotions.6 7 More than "two stories" may thus exist in the
courtroom if litigants attempt to deal with the variety of values
or emotional "frames" that could influence a fact finder.s In my
ed to describe the tenets of critical legal studies for a lay readership. See Richard
Lacayo, Critical Legal Times at Harvard; Of Two Minds in a Bitter Academic Feud,
TIME, Nov. 18, 1985, at 87. Pointing to the impact developments at Harvard have on
the laity and other law schools, the article addressed a feud between Harvard pro-
fessors over critical legal studies. The reporter stated that critical legal scholars
viewed the law as the tool of the powerful (a fact well known to the person in the
street). One could ask whether the laity retained more of a loyalty or belief in the
adversary system and its process than law itself, until recently. Have years of TV
shows like Perry Mason and Law and Order persuaded the public that the adver-
sary system does find the truth and punish the guilty? Does the "person in the
street" now have as much skepticism about the process of the adversary system,
after a few well televised "miscarriages of justice"? (Or, maybe it is just Los Angel-
es. Why are all the bizarre trials there-Rodney King, Reginald Denny, the
Menendez brothers, O.J. Simpson? Is L. the ultimate postmodern city? See MIKE
DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES (1990)).
65. For evidence of this, see the Gender and Race Bias Task Force Reports com-
pleted in many states and several federal jurisdictions. See generally Judicial Intim-
idation, WALL ST. J., May 1, 1996, at A14 (discussing judicial bias task forces);
Saundra Torry, Study of Bias in Courts Splits Judges, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1994,
at Al (discussing also bias task force reports in various jurisdictions).
66. See generally KELIMAN, supra note 45, at 64-85 (discussing different critical
legal studies approaches to the subjectivity of value).
67. Indeed, some have argued that the split between emotion and rationality is
itself a "false dichotomy." See Joan Cocks, Wordless Emotions: Some Critical Reflec-
tions on Radical Feminism, 13 POL. & SoCY 27 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Women As Law Teachers: Toward the Feminization of Legal Education, in HUMANIS-
TIC EDUCATION IN LAW: ESSAYS ON THE APPLICATION OF A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE
TO LAW TEACHING 16 (Columbia University ed., 1981).
68. For an eloquent description of how the categories of law and the structure of
legal process often suppress other "stories" and the truth, see Lucie E. White, Subor-
dination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs.
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view, this reflects the reality of life in a postmodern,
multicultural world-a recognition that if "truth" is to be arrived
at, it is best done through multiple stories and deliberations
rather than through only two.69 How this will be structured in
a litigation system, which is still based on oppositional evidence
presentation, remains to be seen.
I want to address briefly one other element of postmodernism:
the explicit recognition that we reason in binary oppositions v"
with a hierarchy of values, usually subordinating one side of an
opposition, as in male/female, white/black, rule/discretion,
law/equity, market/family, etc.v" In postmodernism this is the
method of deconstruction-the recognition that every "text" has
its ambiguity, its negation, its opposition, its "silence." In some
versions, the idea is to reverse or re-situate the' oppositions,
which, of course, preserves them.72 In some forms, however, the
purpose of deconstruction is to demonstrate that binary
oppositions do not explain the world. Hierarchies of claims hide
more than they reveal. Thus, many in Los Angeles hoped the
jury would convict Rodney King's attackers, not because it was
"a white or black thing," but because they were appalled by the
beating.73
G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 21-32 (1990) (telling the story of a client in a welfare hear-
ing who refused to testify as her advocate suggested and instead told her own true
story demanding justice from the heart where the law would not recognize her
claim).
69. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
70. Postmoderns associated with this observation are Ferdinand de Saussure in
linguistics, Jacques Derrida in literary criticism, and Jacques Lacan in psychoana-
lytic theory. See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Charles
Bally et al. eds. & Roy Harris trans., 1986); JACQUES 'DERRIDA, ACTS OF LITERATURE
(Derek Attridge ed., 1992); JACQUES LAcAN, THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (Dennis
Porter trans., 1992).
71. My personal favorite explication of the effects of this binary opposition in law
is Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRI-
TIQUE 453 (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1991).
72. For example, the argument that some feminists make, that women are differ-
ent and better than men, preserves gender differences. One side of the binary op-
position is still better than another. See Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Same-
ness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and
Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296.
73. Similarly, many hoped that the jury would convict the beaters of Reginald
Denny, because of what they did, not because of a need to set an "oppositional"
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Taken out of its postmodern context, deconstruction is a use-
ful tool for those who criticize the adversary system because it
exposes the distorting properties of both the "text" of adversarial
argument74 and of the literary texts that deconstructionists
analyze. In concrete legal terms, and none of these claims are
new or original to my argument, oppositional presentation of-
ten-though not always75---distorts the truthv" by making ex-
treme claims,77 by avoiding any potentially "harmful" facts, by
verdict to the travesty of the original acquittal in the King beating case. Note how
these cases are known by the victims rather than by the perpetrators-neither
Rodney King nor Reginald Denny was "on trial."
74. As someone who serves in a third-party neutral capacity, as an arbitrator and
mediator, I am as frustrated as Judge Frankel was with the distortions and exag-
gerations made by counsel in pursuing their claims.
75. Consider the contrary informing principles of baseball arbitration, which asks
two sides to make offers that are intended to be less extreme because the arbitrator
must choose one without any modification. The theory, if not the practice, behind this
principle of dispute resolution, is that it will encourage reasonableness. Some would
argue that good advocates do this as well-if they hope to have a fact finder buy
their whole story, they should try to tell the least-extreme, most-reasonable story.
76. For a nice catalogue, by a practicing lawyer, of the distortions in evidence
presented through the adversarial method, see Gorsky, supra note 37. Gorsky lists
evidence distortions as sources of incorrect evidence production or its inequality
where: (1) there is a reluctant witness, whom both parties may be afraid to call; (2)
there is an unawareness of a potential witness because of the lack of independent
investigation; (3) there are inequalities in expert witness production as a result of
economics; (4) witnesses are coached or "over-prepared;" (5) counsel is more inept
than his opponent; and (6) a witness is inept-for example, the witness may be
truthful, but fearful, and therefore very vulnerable on cross-examination. For my
own arguments about how lawyers have to transform their clients' stories to meet
the needs and requirements of the legal system, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Does
Not Tell Us, 2 Mo. J. DISP. RES. 25 (1985).
77. Many justify the adversary system as part of human evolution from trial by
real combat to modern "bloodless" combat in the courtroom. See, e.g., LANDSMAN,
supra note 31, at 8-10 (describing the early origins of the adversary system). Per-
haps the distortions of modern verbal combat have outlived their usefulness and we
can evolve to the next level-a combat-less legal system. For an interesting descrip-
tion of variations in lawyer aggressiveness, even outside of litigation, see Neil A.
Lewis, At the Bar: Wherein a 'New York Style Litigator' Is Cast As the Heavy in the
°Whitewater Affair, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1995, at B18 (describing the variations in
the New York lawyer who "fight[s] at all costs for a client" versus the Washington
lawyer who is more concerned about "how things looked") (attributing remarks to
Bernard Nussbaum, former counsel to the President). Lewis suggests that advice not
to turn over documents to the investigators might be successful in defending a cor-
porate wrongdoer but is not an appropriate tactic for a public official who must in-
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refusing to acknowledge any truth in the opposition," by limit-
ing story telling to two, rather than allowing for a multiplicity of
stories, by refusing to share information,79 or, conversely, by
strategically giving or demanding too much information,"0 by
manipulating information (as in the "battle of experts"), by mak-
ing the true look false (cross-examining a truthful witness) or
the false look true (by offering false or misleading evidence or by
actively "coaching" witnesses).8 Another common complaint
about the adversary system demonstrates one of the claims
made by deconstructionists. In litigation, the unequal resources
of the parties will often determine the hierarchy of opposition. In
an ideal and abstracted form, the adversary system clearly con-
templates adversaries of equal skill and economic support; the
result should not depend upon the resources or "skill" of the
spire trust and higher moral standards. Id.
78. Cognitive psychologists have named this phenomenon "reactive devaluation."
We do not hear the validity of a claim or argument or offer made by "the other
side" simply because it comes from the other side. This particular distortion of ad-
versarial approaches to dispute resolution has become the focus of those studying
negotiation and mediation. If we cannot hear the truth of what our opposition has
to tell us, then a third party mediator can often reduce this distortion by being a
more "neutral" bearer of offers or information. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross,
Introduction, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 16, at 3, 22-23;
Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of the Barriers to Resolu-
tion of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 235 (1993); Lee Ross, Reactive Deval-
uation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION,
supra note 16, at 26.
79. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Sleazy in Seattle, AM. LAW., Apr. 1994, at 5 (describing
sanctions assessed against Bogle & Gates for failing to turn over discovery docu-
ments indicating medical warnings for a drug that caused serious injury to a child
plaintiff); see also Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp.,
858 P.2d 1075 (Wash. 1993). Many legal ethicists, including the distinguished
Geoffrey Hazard, opined that our discovery system and our rules of legal ethics did
not require the disclosure of these documents. See Brian J. Beck, Rediscovering Dis-
covery: Washington State Physicians Insurance Exchange & Association v. Fisons
Corp., 18 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 129, 137 (1994) (discussing Hazard's support of
Bogle & Gates against a motion for sanctions).
80. John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation,
Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569 (1989) (applying the
analysis of game theory and the Prisoner's Dilemma to discovery abuse, based on
oppositional strategic behavior by opposing litigants); Note, Discovery Abuse Under
the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352 (1982).
81. Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True Look False and the False Look
True, 41 Sw. L.J. 1135 (1988).
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argument's representative, but on the merits of the argument.82
We all know, however, that "the 'haves' come out ahead."83
Whatever the persuasiveness or merits of postmodernism's
attack on truth or knowledge generally, its teachings are ex-
tremely problematic for the legal system.' Whatever problems
may inhere in presenting only two stories, or in the impossibility
of knowing what really happened, the legal system must find
facts and make decisions if it is to maintain any semblance of
order. The legal system's problem with postmodernism is the
same as epistemology's: How can we, evaluate anything and by
what standards are we to judge anything? Even critical legal
scholars like Joel Handler' thus acknowledge that even if no
single "procedure ... [has] access to truth or reality, including
science,"86 we must use some measure to assess facts and to
act." For Handler, as for others," that "something" is a
nonfoundational pragmatism: "ITihe test of knowledge is effica-
cy."'89 Handler, however, like other pragmatists, and I ihclude
myself in this group," envision a greater multiplicity of stories
82. This is what happens when the fault lies with the man and not with the art
(i.e., the quality of representation). See Martin P. Golding, On the Adversary System
and Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL LAW, supra note 37, at 98, 112 and PLATO, GORGIAS
(Terence Irwin trans., 1979) for arguments about the morality of the "bought" or
partisan rhetorician. In postmodern parlance, the case turns on the performance or
"performativity" of the advocate, rather than on the "facts," thereby demonstrating
once again that "truth" in the legal system is neither objective nor necessarily ratio-
nal.
83. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SoC'y REV. 95 (1974).
84. Indeed, one might suggest that the label of "nihilists" attached to the critical
legal scholars by Paul Carrington and others (see Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and
the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984)) represents the very fear of the validity of
some of these arguments-if they are persuasive they deal very significant blows to
the entire structure of law and the legal system.
85. Joel F. Handler, Postmodernisn, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26
LAW & Socy REv. 697 (1992).
86. Id. at 703.
87. Id. at 722 ('[Elven local power cannot be confronted with a comprehensive
political and economic plan.").
.88. Such as myself.
89. Handler, supra note 85, at 702.
90. For explorations of the Deweyan sources of this modern legal pragmatism, see
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLmARITY (1989); ELIZABETH V.
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT
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being told, of more open, participatory, and democratic process-
es, yielding truths that are concrete but contextualized, explicit-
ly focused on who finds "truth" for whose benefit.9 ' The femi-
nist epistemologist, Sandra Harding, has called this "strong
objectivity" when the interests of truth finders and the questions
that they ask and answer form part of the description of the
"truth."92 In the final section of this Essay I explore how these
observations may help us both to reform some of the defects of
the adversary system and to open up and more radically
transform our ,hole legal process. This has obvious implica-
tions-requiring further exploration-for our core concepts of
legal ethics. First, however, I want to air some more complaints.
III. THE LIMITED REMEDIAL POWER OF ADVERSARIALISM
What our adversary system, as exemplified by courts, permits
"as resolutions to disputes makes the structure of adversary
argument-limiting cases to two "sides," or a limited set of oth-
er-party arguments through the use of joinder, interpleader, and
subclasses-more problematic. I have argued at length else-
where that courts that are empowered to grant money damages,
guilty or not-guilty verdicts, and injunctions, which are more
often negative than positive, greatly limit what results an adver-
sary argument can achieve.93 Although I am mindful of the fact
that parties are always free to exit the system and settle for
their own more tailored solutions, the truth is that the limited,
(1988); CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF
PRAGMATISM 195-209 (1989) (discussing the views of Richard Rorty); Thomas C.
Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); Margaret J.
Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990); Joseph W.
Singer, Should Lawyers Care About Philosophy?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1752.
91. Handler, supra note 85, at 712-18.
92. HARDING, supra note 43; Sandra Harding, Introduction: Eurocentric Scientific
Illiteracy-A Challenge for the World Community, in THE RACIAL ECONOMY OF SCI-
ENCE: TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE 1, 17-19 (Sandra Harding ed., 1993). "Demo-
cratic values, ones that prioritize seeking out criticisms of dominant beliefs from the
perspective of the lives of the least advantaged groups, tend to increase the objec-
tivity of the results of research." Id. at 18. Note the structural parallel in this argu-
ment to John Rawls's "veil of ignorance" in political philosophy. JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1973).
93. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 768-83.
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remedial imagination of lawyers who bargain "in the shadow of
both the court and the law" often constrain settlements. 4 With-
out rehashing my earlier arguments here, I want to suggest that
we should think carefully about which cases require binary
solutions (and I believe that some cases require such solutions)
and which do not. At the same time, however, we need to exam-
ine why this one mode of dispute resolution still so thoroughly
dominates our thinking about legal problem solving.95 Whatev-
er efforts have been made to expand the scope of processes and
remedies recognized by courts,96 the co-optation of these pro-
cesses by determined advocates continues. 7 As I have argued
elsewhere," expanding the stories, the interests, the issues,
and the stakes actually enhances the likelihood of making
"trades" and finding other creative solutions to problems so that
we can minimize contentious argument and satisfy.more party
needs.99 To accomplish such a reframing of attitudes and
thought processes will require a great deal of re-education and
reorientation; indeed, major cultural, not just ethical, change
among lawyers is needed.' Thinking creatively is not neces-
94. Id. at 775-76.
95. This examination could also extend to business and interpersonal relationships
as well as life in general. For example, see the interesting but depressing example of
application of competitive thinking, derived from game theory, to a wide range of hu-
man problem solving in AVINASH K DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRA-
TEGICALLY: THE COiMfPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS AND EVERYDAY LIME (1991).
96. See, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111
(1976) (multidoor courthouses and other efforts to enact Frank Sander's ideas about
multiple processes).
97. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A
Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1990).
My personal favorite co-optations include a letter written by one advocate to his
adversary that stated, "I have filed an ADR against you," and a recent continuing
education program for defense lawyers that offered advice on "winning in ADR and
negotiation." ADR For the Defense, Defense Research Inc. (Program held in San
Francisco, Sept. 21-23, 1995).
98. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 97, at 12.
99. My favorite illustration of nonadversarial dispute resolution comes from a
UCLA faculty cocktail hour at which several of my colleagues picked at the same
bowl of cocktail mix. None of us were in competition as some chose pretzels, others
nuts and others WheatChex-we wore down the bowl cooperatively and with all of
our needs being met. We valued different things. The more "stories" and interests
we get on the table, the more likely we can arrive at a mutually agreeable solution,
by finding complementary, rather than competitive, interests.
100. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve Problems, Not Make Them: Integrating
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sarily the same process as thinking critically or analytically; the
negative and reactive thinking produced by adversarial argu-
ment may limit more open ways of conceptualizing solutions to
problems. 1'
I will heretically suggest that even some criminal matters-a
category of cases most often understood as paradigmatically re-
quiring binary solutions followed by punishment-might be sus-
ceptible to other processes and remedies such as Victim-Offender
Mediation, 10 2 which attempts to create a guilt-imposing rela-
tionship between offenders and victims of some small crimes to
encourage restitutionary remedies rather than punishment. If
we are to defeat the hold that crime has on us then we must
also broaden and increase our responses"0 ' and searches for
solutions, especially where there is not enough room for all at
the inn-the prison.0 4
In the civil arena, where I have focused my work, we must
consider the cases that do not lend themselves easily to right or
wrong answers0 5 or to more binary solutions. Often, third-par-
ty-imposed solutions, such as those imposed by courts, do not
deal with causes underlying ongoing conflicts or disputes, espe-
ADR in the Law School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. REV. 1995 (1993).
101. See, e.g., JAMES L. ADAMS, CONCEPTUAL BLOCKBUSTING: A PLEASURABLE GUIDE
TO BETTER PROBLEM SOLVING (1986) (explaining how to improve problem solving
skills); MARTIN GARDNER, AHA! AHA! INSIGHT (1978) (discussing problem-solving).
102. See, e.g., ROBERT B. COATES & JOHN GEHM, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: AN
EVALUATION OF VICTIM-OFFENDER RECONCILIATION PROGRAMS (1985) (describing and
evaluating Victim-Offender Mediation); Jennifer G. Brown, The Use of Mediation to
Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247 (1994) (ex-
plaining the history and development of Victim-Offender Mediation and criticizing it
for placing excessive control in the victim's hands).
103. Additionally, systemic efficiency-remedies, treatments, and processes to deal
with the crushing criminal caseload-must be addressed to fashion complete remedies.
104. Obviously, this implicates more important and complex questions of criminal
law and policy. Difficulty lies in learning who benefits from such perceived "more
lenient schemes." "
105. Winning may not be everything; often a short-term win may be followed by
long-term resentment and efforts to execute a judgment or monitor an injunction.
For example, segregation is wrong, but we now wonder whether busing was the best
or only solution. Some groups had tried to look for other solutions earlier. See, e.g.,
Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 487-88 (1976) (citing alterations to the
racial balance remedy, including equality of financing).
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cially if personal or relationship issues are at stake-this in-
cludes commercial as well as civil rights matters. Third-party-
imposed solutions, therefore, may not endure. The courts, to
their credit, have realized this, though not without a vast out-
pouring of scholarship and criticism of the difficult road courts
take when they attempt to order more complex remedial mea-
sures.' Most recently, courts have supervised other kinds of
dispute resolution, particularly in class action settlements of
consumer and antitrust cases 7 and mass torts.' We must
look for ways to preserve limited funds so that they are fairly
distributed to all deserving claimants as well as look for oppor-
tunities in which people may desire things other than, or in
addition to, monetary relief. 9 Greater possibilities of remedy
and more creative "remedial" imaginations should thus affect
the choices we make about what processes to use.
Adversarialism may greatly restrict what can be accomplished.
106. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1313-16 (1976) (stating that continual judicial oversight is necessary if
justice is to be done in an increasingly regulated society); Stephen Yeazell & Theo-
dore Eisenberg, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93
HARV. L. REV. 465, 474-94 (1980) (arguing that institutional litigation, in which
courts are asked to oversee the operation of public institutions, has support from
older judicial traditions).
107. Here, my personal favorite was when I received books from Harcourt, Brace &
Jovanovich, instead of cash, in settlement of an antitrust case involving overcharges
in Bar Review courses. Such a settlement is not unlike the coupons for air fare dis-
counts recently received in settlement of an airline antitrust action. See In re Do-
mestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ga. 1993). These types of
responses illustrate how "in-kind" or other forms of compensation are not zero-
sum-the books and coupons give some benefit to the defendants, decreasing their
cost for our recompense.
108. As in the Virginia bankruptcy court's supervision of the Dalkon Shield
Claimants' Trust ADR program, see Dalkon Shield Claimants' Trust v. Baker (In re
A.H. Robins Co., Inc.), 197 B.R. 587 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995), and the now-rejected
settlement of the breast implant litigation. See Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re
Sillicane Gel Breast Implant Product Liability Litigation), Civ. A. No. CV94-P-11558-
S, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994); Henry Weinstein, New Terms Offered
in Breast Implant Cases, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at D1.
109. Both Judge Jack Weinstein and I have noted that in addition to cash, claim-
ants in mass tort matters also seek some cathartic value in the process they desire.
See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT
OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Mass Tort Settlements: When the Rules Meet the Road,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1215-16 (1995).
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IV. How MULTICULTURALISM (OR PLURALISM) CHALLENGES THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM
Recall that when we speak of the adversary systemwe say the
"Anglo-American" adversary system.1 ' The inquisitorial sys-
tem of civil law countries,"' the mediation of Asian coun-
tries,"' the dispute resolution processes of Native Ameri-
cans,13 and the "moots" of some African cultures". remind
us that legal processes are culturally specific and chosen, not
given. Here I want to explore, very controversially I am sure, the
cultural assumptions of our adversary system as they operate
both at the national and international level. Again, although I
have neither sufficient time nor space to do a complete review of
comparative legal systems,"5 it is important to recognize that
other systems may still have something to teach us. With our in-
creased participation in international treaties and tribunals such
as WTO" s and the Law of the Sea Treaty,"7 the experience
of dealing with multiple parties having different cultures and
legal regimes has revealed that we will have to participate in
110. See generally LANDSMAN, supra note 31, passim (discussing the adversary sys-
tem in terms of the Anglo-American legal tradition).
111. See id. at 50.
112. See Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview: History and Dimensions of Practice,
MEDIATION Q., Sept. 1983, at 4.
113. See MEDIATION Q., Summer 1993 (special Issue on Native American Dispute
Resolution).
114. See Folberg, supra note 112, at 4-5.
115. See, e.g., JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 1985)
(discussing civil law systems); Miijan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction
and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
506, 554-87 (1973) (comparing criminal procedure in adversary and nonadversary sys-
tems) [hereinafter Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers]; Mijan Damaska, Structures of
Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480 (1975) (explaining
the differences between common law and civil law countries by pointing to the dif-
ferent views on authority); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Proce-
dure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) (comparing German and American civil proce-
dure); Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Com-
munist China, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1284 (1967) (discussing the Chinese legal system).
116. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO),
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
117. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, July 29, 1994, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 103-39 (ratifying United Nations Convention of Dec. 10, 1982).
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alternative-to us-forms of dispute resolution and culturally
complex international cooperation.
Within our own borders multicultural concerns are revealed
when immigrants from other systems either fear or will not use
our system because they do not understand or trust it,"' or
when it is alien to what they know. Although our dominant
melting pot and assimilationist ideologies suggest that recent
newcomers to our shores simply should acculturate themselves
to our legal system as one of the few "all-American" institutions,
I, instead, posit that we might do well to take the opportunity of
reexamining our system for ethnocentric bias and try to imagine
creating and utilizing other dispute resolution institutions. The
very premises of our system-that "winning" is all and that
harms suffered are monetized-may not be culturally congruent
with the belief systems of all members of our society.
At its most disturbing and controversial moments, our legal
system presents a malingering question of what commitment our
own citizens have to a system that some perceive delivers only
injustice. Many would argue that the structure of the adversary
system, itself, is not the trouble but, rather, that the inequalities
of resource distribution and access within the system have
caused many disempowered groups to feel less committed to the
legal system."9 Others would suggest that the adversary sys-
tem and the expensive details of its use exacerbate any preex-
118. Lawyers working with immigrant groups in communities like Los Angeles have
reported to me that some national groups, such as some South and Central Ameri-
cans, will not use our adversary system because it is unfamiliar to them. They often
carry with them distrust of official courts from perceptions about corrupt regimes in
their native lands-are we any less corrupt? Obviously, access to courts and to law-
yers plays a large role in this reluctance. Some lawyers and community groups, how-
ever, report that some national groups prefer to create their own community dispute
resolution processes. JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 69-94 (1983) (chroni-
cling the continuation of American immigrant community dispute resolution develop-
ment). Some cultures also reject our American commodification and monetization of
disputing. In another recent example, an elderly Japanese man learned that he had
been paid less than many of his inferiors. His Americanized children urged him to
sue but he said he valued his dignity and the respect he had had in the workplace
more than his desire for money or to make trouble. (Jan Dizard to Howard Gadlin,
personal communication.)
119. See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACISM 109-46 (1992) (illustrating the impact of racism on African
American perceptions of the legal system and profession).
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isting social power differentials. 2 '
I think that the issue goes beyond access and resources within
the process. As Patricia Williams so eloquently reminded us in
her book, Alchemy of Race and Rights, 2' some in our soci-
ety-as a specific example, African-Americans-have been the
"acted upon" in law, as objects of law-property in slave lega-
cy-and did not historically participate in the creation of our
legal process.'22 As some have criticized our "science" for its
exclusion of particular voices,'23 we must wonder what a more
multicultural and integrated group of framers might have cho-
sen for a process if it had been informed by a full representation
of our varieties of immigrant cultures. Although it seems true
that many cultures think in binary terms, take for example the
Asian yin-yang conception, it is not so clear that the dichotomies
or binarisms are arranged hierarchically in the same manner, or
that binary thinking necessarily must structure legal culture.
Chinese mediation, derived from Confucian principles, is de-
signed to seek "harmony, not truth."24 I wonder what would
result if we redefined our legal system to seek "problem-solving"
as one of its goals rather than "truth-finding."'25 Although we
remain committed to detached and unbiased. third-party "neu-
120. Did the "playing of the race card" result in a majority black jury's acquittal of
O.J. Simpson as a "pay back" for the majority white jury in the Rodney King beat-
ing case?
121. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
122. Id. at 216-21.
123. See HARDING, supra note 43.
124. The value of harmony is strongly criticized by those who seek to preserve our
adversarial system in the face of encroachment by "dangerous" ADR methods. See,
e.g., Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in The Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Paci-
fication in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 1 (1993) (criticizing harmony ideology); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudi-
catory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 535-38 (1986) (criticizing the
ADR assumption that consensual settlements of disputes are preferable to adjudica-
tion). I call these critics "litigation romanticists." See Menkel-Meadow, supra note
109, at 1182.
125. I can imagine huge outpourings of objections here-where are justice, punish-
ment, and deterrence?-all of the articulated -current goals of our legal system. I
offer this example as simply an illustration of how we select our goals and how we
could select others. I do not suggest that we solve problems by ignoring justice. Or,
as Rodney King put it, why shouldn't our legal system be constructed to help us "all
just get along" in such a diverse world?
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trals," other cultures value decision makers who understand and
are enmeshed in the community and who have "wisdom" from
experience.'26
I fear the adversary system and its contributions to the larger
culture have hindered rather than helped race and ethnic rela-
tions" by polarizing discussion and by continuing to perpet-
uate their own form of bi-polar thinking. Third-party-imposed
solutions seldom get at root-causes of conflicts or provide endur-
ing solutions. Black/white race relations, as another binary con-
struct, remain the paradigm for thinking about race, despite the
growing multiplicity of race and ethnicities and diversification of
our society and, slowly, of the legal profession itself.' In my
view, we need to rethink ways to permit more voices, more sto-
ries, more complex versions of reality to inform us and to allow
all people to express views that are not determined entirely by
their "given" cultural identities. To that end, let me turn to some
proposals for reform of the adversary system.
V. REFORMING THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
I am torn at this point between choosing from the most incre-
mental reform options, keeping the adversary system in its place
126. As a feminist, I am not endorsing the "wise elder" form of mediation found in
many world-cultures because it tends to be paternalistic and exclusive of women. I
am suggesting, however, that the principles informing such choices differ from ours
and might be worth examining in some areas., Using "substantive expertise? in some
forms of ADR-for example, mini-trials, arbitration, and mediation-reflects this de-
sire for a knowledgeable (and perhaps "interested" or "biased") third-party neutral
and further complicates the questions of ethics and conflicts of interest. See, e.g.,
Poly Software Int'l Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1492-95 (D. Utah 1995) (discussing
complications of applying conflicts rules when small groups of skilled lawyers-in
this case, specializing in a relatively small area of the computer industry-act as
both litigators and mediators).
127. So do Lani Guinier and Susan Sturm. They have looked for other ways to fa-
cilitate the study of race. See Guinier & Sturm, supra note 32.
128. I have, in other contexts, talked about the importance of diversifying the pro-
fession for purposes of broadening how we think about law and its solutions, as well
as its practice. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in
the Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering,
44 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 621 (1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New
Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv.
29 (1987).
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and thereby keeping most of my audience, and beginning with
the most radical of proposals so that, in the end, you will happi-
ly adopt all of my more modest suggestions.
A. Adversarialism Where It Is Appropriate
Being something of a provocateur, I will start with a radical
yet benign suggestion. Because the adversary system has not
been validated empirically as the most effective legal sys-
tem,129 let us think about what it does best and attempt to
cabin its influence to those cases needing the "full-court press" of
adversarialism. Next, let's move on to thinking about what other
processes might appropriately serve other goals.' Many of you
will think that all criminal cases belong in the former category,
where the state can threaten a lone individual's potential loss of
freedom-I disagree.'' Others likely think that all disputes
involving some "public question" belong in open court with fully
contested arguments and rules designed to create fairness of
process and result.' Still others would include in the former
category cases that involve large numbers of people, like the
mass tort, consumer, and securities cases that we face. Yet more
people suggest that we need adversarial, conventional processes
precisely when the parties are unequal so that courts may police
resource and "performativity" imbalances.'33 For me, the opera-
129. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 59, at 6-21; Luban, supra note 1, at 83-
122. But see Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 115, at 578-89.
130. So much of the writing on the adversary system is done by those who imagine
either a criminal or civil paradigm and then attempt to contrive and impose some
universal system for both. Call me a postmodern, but I think enough variation in
our case types already exists that neither process rules nor ethics rules can continue
to be totally global and transsubstantive. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 109, at
1188-201.
131. As William Simon controversially has suggested, it is not always true that
state powers are superior to criminal defendants. See William H. Simon, The Ethics
of Criminal Defense, 91 U. MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1707-13 (1993).
132. See, e.g., David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83
GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622-40 (1995) (discussing the arguments in favor of adjudication
instead of settlement in terms of public good and public values); Judith Resnik,
Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211, 252-53 (1995) (comparing the fairness of ADR and
adjudication).
133. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Preju-
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rive principles are party choice and use of the adversary system
where it is most appropriate and always available-literally as a
"court of last resort."3 4
B. Other Possible Forms of Dispute / Conflict Resolution
What I most want to think about, however, are other forms of
legal dispute resolution. In what circumstances could we begin
to experiment safely with other forms of process through which
we could explore other forms of interaction and ethics? Many
scholars in the dispute resolution field have called on us to pro-
vide both "thick description" and analysis of different modes of
conflict resolution that have been successful, even in perceived
intractable disputes.' Mindful of the postmodern and
multicultural critiques of legal knowledge, could we imagine a
forum where more than two voices could be heard? Here I will
sketch some possible alternate modes of dispute resolution to
consider.
When a dispute involves more than two sides, one could imag-
ine processes with more than just plaintiffs and defendants as
parties. In a modification of old historical forms, one could imag-
ine a tri-partite criminal proceeding with states' interests,
victims' interests, and defendants' interests all represented. Or,
dice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 1359, 1367-75; Owen Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076-78 (1984).
134. Lest you think that I am an ADR romanticist, I was involved recently as a
plaintiff and counsel (with my husband) in three lawsuits (all after other forms of
dispute resolution failed). After filing, two of the three settled. For the case-
typologists among you, the collection and copyright infringement cases settled, the
landlord-tenant-damages, not eviction-did not. By the way, we "won" the damage
case, at least in the sense of getting a judgment; however, we have yet to collect a
dime. The full trial that we had thus did nothing to increase the justice or efficacy
of our claim.
135. See, e.g., DEBORAH KOLB ET AL., WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS
491-92 (1994) (stating that we need to study and learn from disappointments, rather
than bemoan them); MARC H. Ross, THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT: INTERPRETA-
TIONS AND INTERESTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1993) (arguing that studying the
psychocultural specifics of both successful and failed efforts is particularly impor-
tant); CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND JUSTICE, supra note 16 (discussing social
psychology's approach to issues of social unrest); see also DONALD A. SCHON & MAR-
TIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY
CONTROVERSIES (1994) (examining the use of mediation-like processes in very difficult
public policy issues).
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as has occurred in a variety of environmental siting, community
block-grants and other multiparty situations, one could utilize a
multiparty mediation-like process in which a single dispute
broadens community and democratic participation in a single
issue that affects more than two parties and establishes a pro-
cess for greater participation. 136 "Reg-neg"-regulatory negotia-
tion or negotiated rule-making-represents another example of
current recognition that processes other than conventional ad-
versarial ones may more effectively involve more than two par-
ties and lend greater legitimacy to the result if people get in-
volved in the construction of rules before they take effect.'37
We could further adapt our current forms of subclasses, multi-
party, multidistrict litigation, and other forms of consolidation to
allow for participation by more than "two sides" in civil cases
having a variety of private and public issues at stake.
13
In the Center in which I work at UCLA (the Center for Inter-
racial/Inter-ethnic Conflict Resolution) we have begun to develop
formats and fora for discussing divisive issues that attempt to
alter the debate mode and focus instead on structured, refrained,
multiparty "representational," and diverse conversation. In a
recent forum at UCLA on affirmative action (a very disputed
issue on my campus and in my state), for example, we organized
a workshop designed to avoid adversarial and debate-like pre-
sentations. The process involved four diverse presenters, diverse
in views, issues, and demographics, 139 who each briefly stated
136. See KOLB ET AL., supra note 135, at 309-54 (profiling Larry Susskind); LAW-
RENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE (1989).
137. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71
GEO. L.J. 1 (1982) (discussing the history, advantages, and function of negotiating
regulations); Lawrence Susskind & Gerald McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Ne-
gotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985) (examining the results of Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency evaluations of negotiated rulemaking).
138. For my argument that -cases are not so easily denominated "public" or "pri-
vate," see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It, Anyway? A Democratic and
Philosophical Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995).
139. The forum thereby illustrated both demographic and positional diversity. There
were ranges of views on what kind of affirmative action was appropriate in the edu-
cational arena, including discussions of differences in admissions, educational pro-
grams, employment, and contracting; what groups should be part of such plans, and
views that there should be no affirmative action at all. In a very "PC" environment,
the latter view is not easy to openly express, but was accomplished because of the
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their views on the subject of affirmative action including state-
ments about how their personal and individual histories had
affected their views. The speakers were then asked a series of
probative questions by a moderator-facilitator. The questions
that the moderator-facilitator asked purposefully probed more
than adversarially stated extreme positions, such as: What are
the grey areas in your thinking? What evidence would you need
to change your mind? What did you learn from hearing the other
presenters? The four presenters followed the moderator-
facilitator's questions by questioning each other through the
question-reframer-moderator who attempted to dislodge the
personal attacks or hostility in questions and responses. Audi-
ence questioning followed the self-initiated questioning segment
and the forum concluded with an attempt to draft a statement
that reflected commonalities and differences of thinking and
listed areas in which more information was required. All of this
was followed by an audience-participant process-critique session.
I recognize that such a multilayered procedure might not
work in cases calling for an assessment of civil damages or a
determination of guilt. A multilayered procedure certainly may
be used, however, for policy deliberations and in the negotiation
and settlement of large multiparty lawsuits.40 Lani Guinier
and Susan Sturm at the University of Pennsylvania have experi-
mented with similar and other formats in their class on race and
gender theory, with similar purposes: to reduce the distortions of
adversary dialogue in the hope that individuals would be em-
powered to fully confront their own and others' views without at-
tachment to "side" or "identity."' They label their class an
"intermediate space" for discussion, conversation and dialogue,
process protections offered.
140. Indeed, with the exception of the representative-advocates of each "party," this
structure is not that dissimilar from a multiparty, private mini-trial whereby the
principals intend to complete the negotiation and resolve the dispute themselves.
ERIC D. GREEN, CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, THE CPR LEGAL PROGRAM MINI-
TRIAL HANDBOOK (1982). If the audience participated in drafting the statement or
agreement, we might have something that looked like a summary jury trial. See
Thomas P. Lambros, A Summary Jury Trial Primer, in DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON
& IRVINE ADR PRACTICE GUIDE 373 (John Wilkerson ed., 1990) [hereinafter DONO-
VAN LEISURE].
141. See Guinier & Sturm, supra note 32.
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rather than debate.' Similarly, I have called mediation an
"intermediate" space' where individual disputants can meet
outside of both more informal, for example, family or workplace,
and formal, for example, court, settings. Intermediate spac-
es,14 4 even without formal or complexly facilitated rules, may
allow for more authentic grappling with issues and differenc-
es' 4 5 and may even lower the stakes to some extent.'46 In
such environments, as with privately negotiated settlements, we
may arrive at contingent agreements, promises to meet and
confer again, contingent performances, plans for the future with-
out adjudication of the past-all illustrations of postmodern
acceptance of some uncertainty and the need to combine past
disputes with present and future action.
More conventionally, we might examine the circumstances
under which some forms of the civil inquisitorial/investigative
procedures make sense-their major advantage being that a
nonpartisan investigation leads to, at least in theory, a genuine
search for truth. Purporting to engage in a genuine search for
truth may be appropriate for some governmental and regulatory
questions. Furthermore, as long as individual liberty is not at
issue, even the most confirmed adversarialist might ac-
knowledge that the proverbial quest for "truth" is, ultimately,
likely to be both more effective and cheaper.17 Even the Unit-
ed Kingdom, with its commitment to the adversary system,
142. See id.
143. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of
Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 217, 241 (1995)
(review essay).
144. Regarding "intermediate spaces," another personal favorite of mine is the book-
store reading. In a recent reading in Washington, D.C., Derrick Bell demonstrated
the democratic power of such sites by engaging in conversation (after completing his
reading), with a very diverse audience of people-young and old, black and
white-who both supported and challenged his views (and his own position) on race
relations as discussed in BELL, supra note 119.
145. Moreover, intermediate spaces, perhaps, come closer than any other setting to
achieving Jurgen Habermas's "ideal speech conditions." See JURGEN HABERMAS, 2
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1987).
146. I often wonder how much the O.J. Simpson trial would have been different
without the press coverage and play-by-play sports commentary.
147. Note that I do not suggest this in those circumstances as now used when a
"neutral" court officer investigates something like parental fitness and makes recom-
mendations to the court without adversary contestation.
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employs governmental investigatory commissions and proce-
dures far more often than we do. 48
I strongly believe that we are on the right track in experi-
menting and using a variety of forms of "alternative dispute
resolution"-I prefer the new term "appropriate dispute resolu-
tion." Yet, I fear many of these forms (mediation, mini-trials,
settlement conferences, early neutral evaluations, reg-neg) are
becoming corrupted by the persistence of adversarial values. 49
Lawyers and third-party neutrals will clearly have to learn new
roles to play in mediation. In recognition of this need, programs
for teaching people to be effective problem solvers and, heaven
forbid, advocates, within the ADR process are emerging. These
fledgling programs are good, because dealing with the weakness-
es of adversarialism necessitates new mind-sets about law
practice."o
Fact finding, third party neutraling, and judging might also
deserve reconsideration. Some years ago, I suggested that if gen-
der differences in judging and fact finding had any merit, the
system might benefit if it considered using male-female judge
teams, who had to decide together, instead of a single judge. 5'
Consider the changes required of both our judge and jury roles
and selection processes if we are to reflect fully "multicultural"
considerations in decision making and process facilitation.
Close to my heart, and related to the concept of accounting for
multicultural considerations, is my concern regarding whether
different forms of process will require different ethical require-
ments.'52 Should lawyers attending an in-office, Early Neutral
148. See, e.g., THE ROYAL COMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1993, CMND 2263 (fol-
lowing investigation of several cases of "miscarriages" and false convictions in politi-
cal trials). White papers and green papers on important legal issues affecting public
policy are also good sources.
149. In comparison, other forms of "ADR" such as arbitration, summary jury, and
bench trials are intended to be more conventionally adversarial. See Resnik, supra
note 132, at 218-22.
150. See Marguerite Millhauser, Gladiators and Conciliators: ADR-A Law Firm
Staple, 14 B. LEADER, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 1, 30; Marguerite Millhauser, The Unspo-
ken Resistance to Alternative Dispute Resolution, 3 NEG. J. 29, 34-35 (1987).
151. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 59 (1985); see also Judith
Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 1878 (1988).
152. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
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Evaluation session with court-appointed volunteer lawyers' 5
have a duty of candor to the tribunal under Model Rule of Pro-
fessional Conduct 3.3? What conflicts of interests rules should
we apply to those who both mediate and litigate?1"
C. Reforming the Adversary System and Legal Ethics
For those who think that it is not the structure of the adver-
sary system, but the extremes of behavior within it that are the
problem, I offer a not original list of potential procedural and
ethical reforms, though I must admit that I am both cynical
about policing efforts and skeptical that reforms will not them-
selves become the victims of the adversarial process much as we
have seen with Rule 11 reforms 5 5 and are beginning to see
with recent disclosure reforms.'56
So, if the excesses of adversarial behavior concern us we could
prohibit the coaching of witnesses,'5 7 require earlier and more
forthright disclosure of adverse, as well as favorable, facts and
witnesses'58 and adverse legal authority'59 in both civil and
criminal cases, require all lawyers, not just prosecutors to "do
justice"'' ° in lieu of only serving their clients' interests, prohib-
THE DILEMMAS OF MEDIATION PRACTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS (1992); Robert McKay, Ethical Considerations in ADR, in DONOVAN
LEISURE, supra note 140, at 459-82; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professional Responsibility
for Third-Party Neutrals, 11 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Sept. 1993, at 129.
153. This is the practice in the Northern District of California. See N.D. CAL.
A.D.R. 5.
154. See Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah 1995); Hazard,
supra note 34; Menkel-Meadow, Ancillary Practice, supra note 34; Menkel-Meadow,
Conflicts, supra note 34, at 5.
155. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Pro-
cedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761 (1993) (arguing that rather than assess the
revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in terms of winners and losers,
critics should endorse a neutral rulemaking procedure).
156. See Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)- "Much Ado About Nothing?" 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679 (1995).
157. The question that remains, however, is who would police such a private ac-
tivity. See White, supra note 13, for similar arguments about regulating private
negotiation activity.
158. We are trying to do this, somewhat unsuccessfully, with reforms to Rule 26(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Sorenson, supra note 156, at 729-60.
159. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1980).
160. See id. Rule 3.8.
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it the cross-examination of witnesses "known" to the lawyer to
be telling the truth and prohibit the presentation of any evi-
dence at all "known" to be false by the attorney,'61 and impose
serious sanctions for violations of these rules. More radically, we
could require equalization of resources of the advocates, either
by taxing the wealthier litigant or by providing more public
subsidies for poorer litigants; however, given our current reluc-
tance to pay for free legal services for the poor and to enter into
real fee-shifting arrangements (not to mention the socialist na-
ture of this proposal), I doubt that we will ever come close to
realizing this. I suspect, furthermore, that, even if we equalized
economic resources, an inequality in raw, legal talent might still
exist in many cases (it is the man [sic] and not the art, remem-
ber, who makes arguments).6 2 Should we assign lawyers to
cases on a random or lottery basis?"s Could we ever equalize
advocacy skills' so that the "merits"--whatever those may be
in a postmodern world-and not the performance drives the re-
sult?
Although I would certainly like to see abuses of adversarial
behavior curbed (and I still think professional reputation does
161. These latter examples make adversarialists cringe. They raise the important
issue of deciding when a lawyer may appropriately judge his own client, see DAVD
MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER (1973), and raise important
epistemological concerns about how we "know" the truth; see, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside,
475 U.S. 157 (1986) (where a client claimed he had been denied a fair trial by his
counsel's admonitions that he testify truthfully). If my postmodernist critiques apply
to the truth-finding process of the adversary system, they would apply a fortiori to a
client's own lawyer who often has nothing more to go on than a client or witness
interview.
162. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
163. Although, in principle, client choice of lawyer forms the basis of our legal sys-
tem, we know that many exceptions to this premise exist in assigning public defend-
ers and criminal and civil court appointed lawyers, in assigning lawyers in pre-paid
legal plans, and even, for most of us when our liability insurance carriers provide
our defense. With increasing use of managed care and health maintenance organiza-
tions in health delivery, many of us no longer have choice of our doctors-should
lawyers be allocated any differently? When a lottery system of legal services was
proposed some years ago for legal indigents, see Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid for
the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REV. 281 (1980), I strongly opposed it
on class terms. It might be different, however, if it were applied to all litigants.
164. Would we then be asking some lawyers to be "dumb and dumber" while we
try to make others smart and smarter?
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more to police this than anything else, interspersed with a few
very public scandals 65 that cause us to reexamine our loyalties
and rules once in a while),'66 I am skeptical that ethics rules
changes can really reform the adversary system. Adversarialism
is so powerful a heuristic and organizing framework for our cul-
ture, that, much like a great whale, it seems to swallow up any
effort to modify or transform it. Though some legal scholars have
interpreted the Model Rules' language change from "zealous"
advocacy' to "diligence"6 ' to mean that the ethics rules
have shifted somewhat away from adversarialism, I still see the
loophole in the language of the comments-where zeal continues
to rear its dragon-like smoke. No one, however, can point to any
change in lawyers' behavior that has resulted from that lan-
guage change. (Remember the deconstructionists' view about
indeterminate language with no meaning!)
D. Objections and Responses: Conclusion
Although I seem to have come to bury the adversary system, I
recognize that it has its value and there are likely to be a num-
ber of objections to my criticisms and proposals."9 As a former
trial lawyer and continuing reluctant adversarialist 70 I will
165. Such as the involvement of the law firm Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler in the Lincoln Savings and Loan scandal. See George H. Brown, Financial
Institution Lawyers As Quasi-Public Enforcers, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637 (1994)
(discussing the role of lawyers in the collapse of savings and loans); Dennis E.
Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985 (1993) (discussing the
role of the Kaye, Scholer law firm in the savings and loans scandal).
166. Other participants in the W.M. Keck Foundation Forum on the Teaching of
Legal Ethics, published in this issue of the William & Mary Law Review, have ex-
plored the specific issues entailed in whistleblowing on one's own client and the
implications for client confidentiality and loyalty. See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski,
Lawyering in a Hybrid Adversary System, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 45, 51 (1996)
(discussing the attorney's duty to disclose client fraud to the tribunal).
167. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (1980).
168. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1983).
169. See Dzienkowski, supra note 166, passim; Monroe H. Freedman, The Trouble
with Postmodern Zeal, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, passim (1996).
170. I usually refuse speaking engagements styled in debate mode; I refuse all
offers to be an expert witness in legal malpractice or professional responsibility cas-
es; I no longer teach Trial Advocacy; I mediate and arbitrate, but, as anyone who
knows me will say, I can still argue and become quite adversarial.
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canvas a few objections and attempt to respond to them.
Some will say the lady doth protest too much-indeed there is
not enough of an adversary system left today-an argument I
suspect Monroe Freedman will make. With the high settlement
rates and large- number of plea bargains, 7' too few cases ever
see the full test of the adversary system at its best. At another
level, critics like Gary Bellow and Judith Resnik suggest that a
hybrid form of process-a bureaucratic form of process-exists,
both in and out of courts, where an increase of judicial and ad-
ministrative management of cases exists or where, even in court,
judges apply more discretionary, bureaucratic rules and continue
to push the parties toward settlement.72 Others suggest that
all of the attempts to cure the ills of civil litigation-using ADR,
Rule 11, disclosure rules, and civility rules-will destroy the
criminal justice system in cases where the client needs a fully
armed advocate.73 Most telling to me is the fear that if we
tame the adversarial dragon too much, even in civil cases, our
expensive and tedious discovery process will not turn out the
occasional jewel of achievement in locating that famous "smok-
ing memo" that informs the rest of us of serious wrongdoing.'74
In addition, although I have labored long and hard to canvas
the faults of the adversary system, we know that any system
that we might substitute for it would have other, perhaps worse,
flaws for those who fear the power of state investigators, or the
absence of clear standards or governing rules in private dispute
171. Plea bargains are rapidly decreasing in states like California having "three
strikes and you're out" laws. It is estimated that soon all of the 591 courts in the
County of Los Angeles will be occupied with criminal cases in which third time of-
fenders can no longer plea bargain. There may be no civil adversary system left if
full trial is contemplated. See Stephanie Simon, Civil Courts Also Feel Squeeze of 3
Strikes' Cases, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1995, at Al.
172. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 403-14 (1982).
Gary Bellow made this suggestion in a personal communication with the author in
March 1995.
173. See Silver, supra note 11, at 887.
174. The Pinto case, see Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981),
the asbestos litigation, see PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS
INDUSTRY ON TRIAL, (1985), the Dalkon Shield litigation, see RIcHARD B. SOBEL,
BENDING THE LAW (1991), and now the tobacco cases, see, e.g., RJR Nabisco Hold-
ings Corps. v. Dunn, 657 N.E.2d 1220 (Ind. 1995), are examples of these triumphs of
our adversary system.
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resolution processes. I often teach about the role of the lawyer in
the adversary system by looking at the historical cycles in which
the juvenile justice system has turned.75 What began as a
more private, benevolent, but paternalistic system, without ad-
versary protections, was converted during the "Due Process
Revolution" to include virtually the full panoply of adult ad-
versarial adjudication techniques and protection that we witness
today.7 ' Most recently, with the advent of ADR and more so-
phisticated or simply different psychological models, we have
again moved closer to more flexible, private, individualized set-
tlements and treatment programs-although now the juvenile at
least has a lawyer. A similar story can be told with respect to
some government benefit programs and adjudicatory and admin-
istrative decision making. Process itself is therefore subject to
the same "paradigm shifts"-or trends, or fads-as other intel-
lectual frameworks. (You can see this is coming to a postmodern
conclusion.)
Thus, although I am not happy with the structural,
epistemological, remedial, and behavioral aspects of the ad-
versarial system, I am skeptical that we can reform it by chang-
ing some ethical or procedural rules. A cultural change is re-
quired, and that is not easy to legislate. What I urge instead is
the cabining of the adversarial system to the situations where it
can do its best work, with all the limitations I have described. I
would prefer that we take the teachings of postmodernism and
multiculturalism seriously enough to consider other forms and
formats of conflict and dispute resolution-such as employing
many-personed and -sided factual presentations and handling
disputes with more deliberative and participatory party and fact-
finding processes-and begin to evaluate their strengths and
weaknesses as we come to develop something of a typology for
assessing which cases belong in which ADR process.'77 I be-
175. I rely upon MURRAY SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2d ed.
1985), which raises questions about the value of the adversary system, starting with
the Gault decision. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
176. See AUERBACH, supra note 16, at 126-27.
177. See, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the
Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49
(1994) (explaining how to determine which ADR procedure, if any, best suits a par-
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lieve that each process will need to carry its own ethics-the
zeal of the advocate does not play well in mediation and the
mediator is both more active and more complex a third-party
neutral than the judge who is governed by the Judicial Code of
Conduct."8 To take up a more radical strain of postmodernism,
our legal processes and ethics are "in play" (or, in the French,
"at play"). Our experimentation with ADR and other forms of
legal process reflects our collective dissatisfaction, for a wide
diversity of reasons, with the traditional adversary model and
our current postmodern penchant for "many methods," when one
will not suffice. I firmly believe that the only way to reform the
adversary model is to successfully "oppose" it with other modes
and processes and see if we can create a more varied legal sys-
tem, one that is more sensitive to the particular postmodern
needs of parties and the particularities of cases. I do not think
that any one micro-reform or any single process will successfully
supplant and replace the adversary system. I hope, however,
that the post-postmodern legal system will give parties a greater
choice about how they want to resolve their disputes. Greater
choice in dispute resolution will allow lawyers who want to be
"moral activists,"79 problem solvers,' 80 lawyers for the situ-
ation '8  or the community,182  discretionary lawyers,8 3  civic
republicans, 18& or statesmen 5 [sic] to have greater flexibility
ticular dispute).
178. At least one judge, Judge Weinstein, has applied the conflict standards of the
Judicial Code of Conduct to a court-appointed mediator-special master. See In re
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735 (E. & S.D. N.Y. 1990) (discuss-
ing the ethics of Ken Feinberg).
179. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 160-61 (1988).
180. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 100.
181. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Dimensions of Ethical Responsibility: Relevant Others,
54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 965 (1993); Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering
Brandeis As People's Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445 (1996); Monroe Freedman,
Brandeis' Lawyer for the Situation, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 1, 1996, at 21.
182. THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1991).
183. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
184. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988);
Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION 230 (Raymon L. Solomon et al. eds., 1992).
185. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1994).
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in the models they choose. Not everyone will have to be a "hired
gun" in an epistemological system that is crumbling as we
speak.
